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Abstract 
In previous papers, we asserted that software system safety is 
primarily concerned with epistemic questions, that is, 
questions concerning knowledge and the degree of confidence 
that can be placed in that knowledge.  We also enumerated a 
set of 21 foundational epistemic questions, discussed some of 
the difficulties that exist in answering these questions 
adequately today, and speculated briefly on possible research 
that may provide improved confidence in the sufficiency of 
answers in the future.  This paper focuses on three of the 
foundational questions. For each of these questions, current 
answers are discussed and potential research is proposed to 
help increase the justifiable level of confidence. 
1 Introduction 
Begin at the beginning and go on till you  
come to the end; then stop.  
 (Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland) 
 
Philosophy and engineering seem to be very different, 
unrelated disciplines. Philosophy asks grand, abstract, big 
picture questions. Why is there something rather than 
nothing? What is real? What is truth, and how do we know 
when we have found it?  Engineering asks ordinary, practical, 
detailed questions.  How much weight can the bridge hold?   
Does this particular wing design provide enough lift?  How 
can we build a stronger, more effective, cheaper mousetrap?  
Some branches of philosophy are irrelevant to engineering, 
but at least one—epistemology—is quite relevant. 
 
Epistemology is one of the major branches of study in 
philosophy [8]. It is concerned with seeking answers to 
questions such as, ‘What do we know,’ and ‘How do we 
know we know what we know?’ [26]. Abstract questions such 
as these may have little direct relevance to engineering, but 
concrete versions of such questions are not only relevant, but 
essential. 
 
Consider, for example: What do we know about the safety of 
an automated control system? Upon what assumptions are we 
resting our knowledge?  How do we know that what we think 
we know about safety is accurate? These are critical 
engineering questions; for system safety professionals, they 
are probably the most important questions.  They are also 
questions about epistemology (that is, epistemic questions). 
 
In two previous papers [16, 17], we identified and refined a 
collection of fundamental epistemic questions about software 
system safety, and discussed possible research activities that 
may enable improved confidence in the accuracy of answers 
to the questions.  In this paper, we focus on three specific 
questions: 
 
 What does ‘at least as safe as’ mean? 
 What is the appropriate level of confidence to be 
attached to the satisfaction of standards? 
 What information is available to accident investigators?   
 
After a synopsis of our previous work, we devote one section 
to each of the three questions. In the final section of the paper, 
we address another question (‘So what?’) by suggesting some 
ways in which the ideas presented in the paper may benefit its 
readers. 
2 Previous Work 
The past is never dead. It’s not even past.  
 (William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, Act I, Scene iii) 
 
Readers who are familiar with the two previous papers may 
skip this section.  Readers who are not familiar with those 
papers should find enough information here to make the rest 
of the paper intelligible on its own. 
2.1 Motivation 
For any system upon which lives depend, the system should 
not only be safe, but the designers, operators, and regulators 
of the system should also know that it is safe.   For software-
intensive systems, universal agreement on what is necessary 
to justify knowledge of safety does not exist. Theorists and 
practitioners have long quarrelled with each other and among 
themselves over the issue.  
 
The existence of these quarrels, the associated wide range of 
existing opinions among well-known experts, and the 
emotional fervour with which these opinions are held and 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110015881 2019-08-30T17:31:45+00:00Z
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expressed [18, 33] motivated our initial work.  We posited 
that one of the chief reasons for the lack of consensus may be 
that the community is trying to answer broad questions 
without first refining those questions into simpler, more 
foundational questions.  So we set out to discover what those 
foundational questions might be. 
2.2 Definitions 
For these foundational questions to be fully understood, a 
common understanding of certain words and phrases is 
needed.   
 
Epistemology was already described in the introduction.  Its 
primary definition is ‘the theory or science of the method or 
grounds of knowledge’. A common related adjective is 
epistemic, which means ‘of or relating to knowledge or 
degree of acceptance’ [29]. 
 
Common verbs used in relation to epistemic questions include 
believe, think, and know.  These verbs have multiple shades of 
meaning, and are often used somewhat differently by 
different people.  One person may use the three verbs almost 
interchangeably. Another person may use the three words to 
express graduated levels of confidence. For such a person, 
believe may correspond to ‘more likely than not’, think to 
‘very likely’, and know to ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (or 
perhaps to even a stronger standard)1. 
 
Safety may be defined absolutely as ‘freedom from accidents 
or losses’ [23], with the adjective safe thus similarly meaning 
‘free from accidents or losses.’  Such definitions are ideals; 
no system can be truly said to be absolutely and forever free 
from accidents or losses until it has been decommissioned. 
So, in practice the words are implicitly (if not always 
explicitly) modified by  a notion of acceptability; where the 
definition of acceptable varies over time, among different 
domains and systems, among different regions and cultures, 
and even among different individuals [6], [22], [37], [40], 
[41]. 
 
Based on the above definitions, the sentence that began 
section 2.1 means ‘For any system upon which lives depend, 
the system should not only be acceptably free from accidents 
and losses, but the designers, operators, and regulators of the 
system should also have the required level of confidence that 
the system is acceptably free from accidents and losses.’   
2.3 Results 
We developed a collection of 21 foundational epistemic 
questions, divided into two primary categories: questions 
about existing systems, and questions about future systems.  
The questions about existing systems were further divided 
                                                          
1 Some philosophers enjoy debating whether applying the verb ‘know’ (or the 
noun ‘knowledge’) to something that is false is ever appropriate [5], [9], [13].  
As fun as such a debate may be, it is irrelevant in discussions about system 
safety: words such as ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ are used, and sometimes that 
which is said to ‘known’ turns out to be false.  
into two additional categories: questions about that are 
independent of whether an accident or loss has occurred to the 
system and questions that are specific to gaining knowledge 
after an accident or loss has occurred. The questions about 
future systems were divided into three additional categories: 
questions about systems that are intended to replace existing 
operational systems, questions about systems that are truly 
new, and questions that are common to both replacements and 
truly new systems. 
 
The 21 questions are shown below in the order in which they 
were numbered and described in our second paper [17]2: 
 
Existing Systems: Accident-Independent 
1 How is operational safety assessed?    
2 How does operational safety compare with expected safety?     
3 How should difference in safety assessments be reconciled?   
4 How does the operational environment affect safety? 
5 What maintenance is required for safety? 
6 How do changes affect safety? 
 
Existing Systems: Accident-Related 
7 What information is available to accident investigators?   
8 How do investigators know all relevant factors have been 
found?  
9 How can lessons taught by an accident improve safety?   
 
Future Systems: Replacements 
10 What does ‘at least as safe as’ mean?   
11 What are the safety implications during transition?   
 
Future Systems: Truly New 
12 How is the desired level of safety to be determined?    
13 What can be learned from existing systems?   
14 How will novel technologies affect safety?    
 
Future Systems: Both Replacements and Truly New 
15 What level of confidence in safety is required?   
16 How is knowledge obtained about the intended operational 
environment?   
17 How is the sufficiency of safety requirements assured?   
18 How is the sufficiency of implementation assured?   
19 How are assumptions and implications understood?   
20 What is the level of confidence provided by assessment 
methods and tools?   
21 What is the appropriate level of confidence to be attached 
to the satisfaction of standards?    
 
Questions 10, 21, and 7 are the focus of the reminder of the 
current paper.  Each is discussed in a separate section below. 
 
                                                          
2 Some readers may be asking, ‘Is there any significance to the numbering 
scheme, or the order of the questions?’  The answer is, ‘No.’ Although 
developing a priority scheme for the questions, and numbering them 
according to that scheme is possible, perhaps even desirable, we have not 
done it.   
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3 As Safe As 
Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety.  
 (William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part 1, Act II, Scene iii) 
 
A common requirement imposed on any new system that will 
be used to replace an existing system is that it be at least as 
safe as the system it is replacing.  This requirement raises the 
obvious question:  What does ‘at least as safe as’ mean?  Or, 
to rephrase the question into a more explicitly epistemic form: 
How can we know that a new system will be ‘at least as safe 
as’ the system it will replace? 
3.1 Today 
Answers to the question today vary depending on specifics 
about the application domain, the systems themselves, and the 
operating environment. Equally varying is the level of 
confidence that can be justifiably placed in the answers. 
 
On one side of the similarity spectrum are systems with 
characteristics such as the following: 
 
 the operating environment for the replacement system 
will be the same as for the old system; 
 the functional requirements are unchanged; 
 the new system will use identical components to the old 
system, within an identical architecture; 
 the behavior of system components individually and 
collectively is well-understood; 
 analyses and tests conducted on the old system before it 
was deployed correspond well to actual operation, and 
the same analyses and tests will be conducted on the new 
system. 
 
As long as state-of-the-practice design, assessment, and 
testing, and system safety methods are followed, a very high 
level of confidence is justified that a new system with these 
characteristics will meet or exceed the operational safety of 
the system it is replacing. 
 
In addition to not having any of the positive characteristics 
listed above, replacement systems on the far other side of the 
similarity spectrum have characteristics such as these: 
 
 the new system implements functions in software that 
either did not exist in the old system or that were 
implemented by other means; 
 new technologies will be used in some aspect of the 
replacement system; 
 the interface between the operators and the system is 
different; 
 the projected operational costs for the new system must 
be substantially less than those of the old system. 
 
If a replacement system possesses all of these characteristics, 
then it is fundamentally and substantially different from the 
existing system. In such a situation, ‘at least as safe as’ would 
not be so much a specific requirement as it would be one of 
the considerations used in determining the desired level of 
safety, and answering questions 12-14 would be more 
important than answering question 10. 
 
Most replacements systems will have characteristics that fall 
between the extremes. A common scenario is one in which 
the replacement system is intended to share many of the same 
components and general architecture with the old system and 
perform all of the functions that the old system could perform 
(perhaps with some of these functions newly implemented in 
software), while also performing some entirely new functions. 
The introduction of anti-lock braking systems (ABS) to 
automobiles was an instantiation of this scenario, for 
example. ABS perform all of the functions of traditional 
braking systems, while adding the function of preventing 
lock-up of the brakes (and the attendant loss of steering 
control) when rapid deceleration is required. 
 
Conversations with industry practitioners suggest that current 
best practices for satisfying the ‘at least as safe as’ 
requirement are based on comparative hazard analyses. That 
is, a planned replacement system will be considered to satisfy 
the requirement if it can be shown to eliminate or control all 
the hazards eliminated or controlled by the existing system, 
without introducing any new, inadequately handled hazards.  
The difficulty of making such a demonstration (and the 
confidence that can be placed in the correctness of the 
demonstration) is affected by the same factors that affect the 
difficulty of hazard analysis in general.  Further complexity 
arises when the introduction of a new system creates new 
modes of operation or encourages methods of working that 
cannot directly be compared with previous operations.   For 
instance, some have argued that the introduction of ABS 
systems encourages drivers to brake later and harder knowing 
that they are protected by the additional safety margins 
provided by these devices [41]. 
3.2 Tomorrow 
Thus, the research that will permit higher levels of justified 
confidence in answering the ‘as safe as’ question is similar to 
the research that will improve confidence in the completeness 
and efficacy of hazard analysis generally. Potential research 
areas include the following:  
 
 identifying novel hazards arising from new technologies, 
applications, domains, or environments; 
 understanding hazards introduced by choices made for  
human-machine interfaces;  
 predicting the consequences and likelihoods of worst-
case events; 
 recognizing when assumptions made during system 
design have been violated in system operation to the 
extent that new hazards may exist which the system was 
not designed to eliminate or control; 
 transferring lessons taught concerning hazards in one 
domain or industry to other domains or industries; 
 exploring architecturally-based hazard mitigation 
strategies for software-intensive systems; 
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 increasing automated support for all of the above areas.  
 
One promising approach to conducting research in these areas 
is to exploit the natural relationship between after-the-fact 
accident causality relationships and before-the-fact hazard 
identification. An example of this approach is Leveson’s 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis [25]. 
4 Standards & Confidence 
We are generally the better persuaded by the reasons we 
discover ourselves than by those given to us by others.  
 (Blaise Pascal) 
 
Standards are a controversial topic, particularly in relation to 
software-intensive systems, and even more particularly in 
relation to the safety of software-intensive systems. Question 
21 from our list engages the controversy directly: What is the 
appropriate level of confidence to be attached to the 
satisfaction of standards?   
4.1 Today 
Much current debate revolves around how this question 
should be answered.  Significant differences of opinion exist 
concerning the relative importance of controls on the process 
used to develop software, satisfaction of pre-determined 
standardized objectives for each software system, and the 
development of system-specific safety arguments.  
 
Existing standards embody the full range of these differences, 
from the fully process-centric [38] to the completely 
argument-centric [27], and everything in between [1, 2, 32, 
34, 35, 36]. Amplifying the differences of opinion are 
published criticisms of various approaches contained not only 
in academic and professional papers [7, 10, 15, 40], but also 
in reports of government-appointed reviews [14, 28] and 
prestigious technical bodies [19].  Decreasing the likelihood 
of resolving the differences are legal and business reasons for 
companies to keep secret the details of exactly how they 
satisfy applicable standards. 
 
The situation is such that for any specific instantiation of the 
question (‘What is the appropriate level of confidence to be 
attached to the satisfaction of specific standard X?’), well-
known, respected people can likely be found to answer, 
‘None at all.’  Equally well-known and respected people can 
also likely be found to answer, ‘Beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 
4.2 Tomorrow 
To improve the current chaotic state of affairs in this area, a 
combination of both research and social / cultural changes 
seems necessary. This combination includes items such as the 
following: 
 
 Conducting retrospective studies of the effectiveness of 
existing methods, processes, tools, and standards as 
actually used; 
 Developing a better understanding of how various 
standards are applied in practice, rather than basing 
criticisms on the bare text alone; 
 Developing standards only after credible evidence exists 
to support the standard; 
 Conducting case studies and realistic experiments on new 
methods, processes, and tools before they widely used; 
 Removing legal and business barriers to open sharing of 
any type of information that relates to improving safety; 
 Exploring ways to make safety arguments for public 
systems publically available in an understandable form. 
 
Properly developed, applied, and maintained standards have 
contributed significantly to quality and safety in many 
disciplines. Activities and research such as proposed above 
should help ensure that this will be, in reality and perception, 
the case for software systems-related standards, too. 
5 Aiding Investigators  
I’m not saying there won’t be an Accident now, mind you.  
They’re funny things, Accidents.  You never have them  
till you’re having them.  
 (A. A. Milne, The Complete Tales of Winnie the Pooh) 
 
History suggests that for nearly any complex system, 
accidents of some sort are inevitable, no matter how carefully 
the system is design, deployed, and operated. When an 
accident happens, the likelihood that investigators will be able 
to determine what happened is strongly related to the quantity 
and quality of the information available to them. Hence the 
question: What information is available to accident 
investigators?  Or, to rephrase the question into a more 
explicitly epistemic form: How do accident investigators 
know they have uncovered all the relevant information? 
5.1 Today 
For traditional systems and components a good understanding 
tends to exist of the information needed to reach valid 
conclusions in an accident investigation. Flight data and voice 
recorders, for example, are required for commercial aircraft, 
because the information they contain is often critical to an 
accident investigation. An illustration of the criticality of the 
information contained in such devices can be seen in the June 
2009 crash of Air France in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast 
of South America.  Before the flight data and voice recorders 
were found in May 2011, the causes of the accident were 
almost certainly not going to discovered by the investigating 
agency, France’s Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la 
sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA). Now, however, the BEA 
is significantly more confident that they will be able to 
determine what happened [11]. 
 
The situation for software-intensive systems is different from 
the situation for more traditional systems. No consensus has 
yet been reached about what constitutes the necessary or 
sufficient information to be recorded and preserved for 
accident investigators, even within the commercial air 
transportation domain.  Some specific systems or subsystems 
keep track of sufficient information to enable investigators to 
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recreate the state of the software and computers at the time of 
an accident3.  Other systems or subsystems do not.  So the 
current answer to the first form of the question is, ‘It 
depends,’ and the answer to the second form is, ‘They might 
not.’ 
5.2 Tomorrow 
To move these answers from the doubtful to the affirmative, 
research in the following areas seems needed: 
 
 Exploring the efficacy and practicality of currently 
proposed ideas for providing more information to 
investigators, such as cockpit video recorders, and real-
time streaming of data;  
 Creating techniques and tools for assisting software 
system implementers in determining what information 
about these systems should be made available in the 
event of an accident; 
 Determining how to ensure that this information is 
preserved, and presented to investigators in a usable 
format; 
 Developing and evaluating accident causation models [4] 
that account adequately for the rapidly increasing 
complexity of software-intensive systems; 
 Evaluating the extent to which lessons taught by previous 
accidents are being learned and incorporated into new 
systems. 
 
Without research in these areas, investigating accidents 
involving software-intensive systems is likely to continue to 
be difficult, with confidence in the results often lower than 
desired.  
6 A Final Question: So What? 
An idea not coupled with action will never get  
any bigger than the brain cell it occupied 
 (Arnold H. Glasgow) 
 
This paper expanded on three of twenty-one epistemic 
questions about software systems.  Researchers who read the 
paper may want to consider whether their expertise and 
interests match any of the proposed research areas, and if so, 
how they might begin to make contributions in the area(s).  
Industry practitioners may want to consider how their 
companies answer the three questions, and whether there is 
anything that they can do to improve those answers. 
Regulators may want to consider whether one or more of the 
ideas presented here might help them in their daily activities.  
Readers of all types may want to consider reading the 
references cited in the paper.  Everyone is welcome to 
correspond with us about this work. 
                                                          
3 See [3] for an example of an incident in which sufficient information was 
available to investigators.  However, it is not clear from published accounts, 
or from private conversations with individuals familiar with unpublished 
details about the occurrence, whether adequate information would have been 
available if the identical events had resulted in a hull loss, instead of simply a 
bit of internal damage, and a very unpleasant ride for the passengers. 
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